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INTERNATIONAL I.Aw-TREATY PROVISIONS DEALING WITH THE
STATUS OF PRE-WAR BILATERAL TREATIEs-"The effect of war upon
the existing treaties of belligerents is one of the unsettled problems of
the law."1 At one time, writers on international law felt that war,
ipso facto, abrogated all bilateral treaties between the combatants, with
the exception of those treaties especially designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. The modern trend is to a more flexible approach; the
courts attempt to discern the intention of the parties at the time they
concluded the treaty2 or deal with the problem pragmatically, preserving or annulling the treaties as the necessities of war exact.3 Disagreement persists, however, and it is the purpose of this comment to supplement the previous comparative study with a discussion of the efforts
of the United States Government to resolve the problem in framing
treaties after World Wars I and II and an analysis of how these efforts
have fared in the courts.
The unsettled state of the law in this field provided the motivation
for the comprehensive provision in the treaty of peace after World
War I attempting to eliminate any disagreement as to which treaties
between the various powers were still in force, and which had been
abrogated by the war. 4 Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles proTecht v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222 at 240, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
BBITisH YEARBOOK oP INT. LAw,
1921-1922, 37 at 39.
s Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222 at 241, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
4 This type of provision may not solve the basic question behind its inclusion, that is,
what effect did the outbreak of war have on existing treaties. If the provision were made
to relate back to the commencement of hostilities, the entire problem could be solved by
treaty. The opportunity to do so has been overlooked in the treaty provisions following
1

2

Sir Cecil Hurst, "The Effect of War on Treaties,"
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vided for notification, within six months after the coming into force
of the treaty, as to which of the bilateral treaties or conventions with
Germany the Allied or associated powers wjshed to revive. The Senate
of the United States did not approve ratification of this treaty and,
as a result, a separate treaty of peace was concluded with Germany
which did not go into effect until November II, 1921.11 Under this
treaty, the Treaty of Berlin, t¾e United States was accorded the benefits of many of the provisions of the Versailles treaty, including Article
289, even though we were not a party thereto. 6 This privilege was
exercised in the notification to Germany, before May II, 192Z,. that
the United States wished to revive the patent agreement of 1909.7
After peace was established, negotiations were begun for a treaty of
friendship, commerce and consular rights. This treaty, although signed
on December 8, 1923, was not officially proclaimed until October
14, 1925.8

In discussing the problems that have reached the courts of the
United States in this area, three periods should be marked out for
analysis. They are (1) the period from the entry of the United States
into the war until the last day for notification under article 289 of the
Treaty of Versailles as incorporated into the Treaty of Berlin; (2)
the period after the last day for notification, May II, 1922, until the
proclamation of the new treaty of friendship, commerce and consular
rights; and (3) the period after October 14, 1925. In this comment
the emphasis will be on the second period, although the others will
be treated briefly.
The status of treaties between the United States and the Central
Powers during the period after the declaration of war is dealt with in
the cases of Techt 11. Hughes,9 Goos 11. Brocks,1° and The Sophie
World War II. However, in tp.e United States, Techt v. Hughes is the leading case on the
effect of the outbreak of war itself, regardless of what treaty provisions may provide for in
the period after the fighting is over.
42 Stat. L. 1939 (1923).
"The benefits of Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles ••. are among those secured
to the United States by the Treaty with Germany." Telegram from Secretary of State
Hughes to the Ambassador to Germany in 1922. See 5 HACKWORTH, TucBsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 388, hereafter cited as HACKWORTH.
7 "The government of the United States desires to revive the Patent Agreement concluded between the United States and the German Empire on February 23, 1909." Telegram from Secretary of State Hughes to the Ambassador to Germany, May 6, 1922. See
5 HACKWORTH 388.
s 44 Stat. L. 2132 (1927).
9 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
10117 Neb. 750, 2~3 N.W. 13 (1929); 27 Mich. L. Rev. 969 (1929).
5

6
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Rickmers.11 In the T echt case, Judge Cardozo allowed a citizen of
Austria-Hungary to inherit property from an ancestor who died intestate on December 27, 1917 by holding article II of an 1848 convention between the United States and Austria12 still in force. In rejecting
the contention that the declaration of war had abrogated the treaty,
Cardozo felt that "provisions compatible with a state of hostilities,
unless expressly terminated, will be enforced, and those incompatible
rejected." Goos v. Brocks applied the inheritance provisions of the
1827 treaty with the Hanseatic Republics,1 3 and the 1828 treaty
with Prussia,1 4 to an intestate death on October 23, 1917; and the
New York District Court protected the Sophie Rickmers from discriminatory tonnage duties when she entered New York harbor on
September 27, 1921, using the same treaties. These decisions are well
reasoned. They are careful to limit their holdings to the narrow issue
of the effect of war itself, and do not deal with the status of treaties
under the provisions of the 1921 agreement with Germany.111 It is
only when examining the cases dealing with this latter problem, the
problem of the second period set out above, that doubt arises. Three
decisions have been rendered in this area also. State v. Reardon was
decided in 1926,1 6 Hempel v. Weedin in 1928,1 7 and In re Meyer's
Estate in December of 1951.18 It is the recentness of this last decision
that creates the need for a thorough analysis of the area. In these cases,
provisions of the Prussian treaty of 1828, the treaty with the Hanseatic
Republics of 1827, or both, are applied to situations occurring in
October of 1924, November of 1923, and August of 1924 respectively.
It is submitted that since we did not notify Germany of an intention
to revive these treaties, they were not in force at this time, and to the
extent these decisions enforce their provisions, they are unsound. To
facilitate a proper evaluation of these decisions, it might be well to set
11 (D.C. N.Y.) 45 F. (2d) 413 (1930); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 947 (1930).
Stat. L. 944 (1851).
1s 8 Stat. L. 366 (1846).
14 8 Stat. L. 378 (1846).
15 ''The question now under consideration is narrowed, then, to whether or not the
pre-war treaties continued in force between July 14, 1919 and November 11, 1921, the
duties in question having been imposed during that period." The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.
(2d) 413 at 418 (1930).
''This brings us to the real problem presented by this appeal, viz.: Did the declaration
of war against the German Empire operate to suspend or annul the provisions of the
treaties." Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750 at 756, 223 N.W. 13 (1929).
16120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158 (1926).
17 (D.C. Wash. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 949, reversed without discussion of this point, 28
F. (2d) 603 (1928).
18 107 Cal. App. (2d) 799, 238 P. (2d) 597 (1951).
12 9
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out their substance and the grounds and reasoning upon which they
rest.
When a citizen of the United States died intestate in Kansas on
October 15, 1924, the state moved to acquire title to his property on
the theory that his only heirs were German citizens, residents of
Prussia, and there was no statute removing the common law disqualification against inheritance by aliens. The alien heirs opposed this action
on the ground that article 14 of the Prussian treaty of 182819 gave
them the right to sell the property and remove the proceeds. The
Supreme Court of Kansas, 20 relying heavily on Techt v. Hughes, held
that the treaty was ·not annulled by the outbreak of war. In answer
to the state's claim that failure to notify under the Treaty of Berlin
had ended the treaty of 1828, it was held that article 289 of the
Versailles treaty, as incorporated into the Treaty of Berlin, "merely
extended . . . the privilege of reviving any treaties . . . with Germany
. . . which had been annulled or suspended by the war, but it does
not follow that a part of a treaty which remained unimpaired required
revival in order to remain in force." This latter proposition was
justified by saying: 21
"It seems obvious that there was no intention of absolutely wiping
out all former treaties between the United States and Germany.
There was necessarily an implied exception in favor of those
entered into to establish a permanent status, such as one settling a
boundary dispute. Nor can it have been intended to divest property rights that had already vested under existing treaties."
With an eye to evaluation, it should be noted that there were not at
this time, and never had been, any treaties between the United States
and Germany establishing boundary lines. Also, there is no room
for argument against the principle that regardless of when a treaty
is abrogated, rights that have vested prior to the abrogation can not
be affected thereby. This has been settled doctrine in the United
States since 1823.22 Therefore, State v. Reardon leaves us with the
mere assertion that there was no intention, under the treaty of Berlin,
19 "And where, on the death of any person holding real estate, within the territories
of the one party, such real estate would, by the laws of the land, descend on a citizen or
subject of the other, were he not disqualified by alienage, such citizen or subject shall be
allowed a reasonable time to sell the same, and to withdraw the proceeds without molestation." 8 Stat. L. 379 at 384 (1846).
20 State v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158 (1926).
21 Id. at 619.
22 Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 464
(1823).
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to require notification to Germany on treaties which had not been
abrogated by the outbreak of war.

Hempel 11. Weedin23 involved an attempt by immigration officials
to deport an alien who had entered the United States from Germany
on November 16, 1923. It was claimed that Hempel's entry violated
section 19 of the Immigration Act of 191724 inasmuch as he had been
convicted of embezzlement, a felony, before coming here. Hempel
proved his pardon by German authorities, plus full disclosure of the
facts to the American embassy, before obtaining his visa. The court
refused to grant the deportation order. This decision may Q_Dly be
affording comity to the German pardon; but the court also applied
certain stipulations in the treaty of 1828 with Prussia providing that
citizens of the respective states have the same security and protection
as natives of the country wherein they reside.
Although Bertha Meyer, a German national and citizen of Bremen,
died intestate on August 2, 1924, the final accounting on her estate
of three hundred shares of stock located in California was not rendered
until December 1, 1950. Under California law her daughter was
entitled to one half of her estate, with the remaining half being shared
by three grandchildren. As nonresidents, the heirs were required to
appear and claim their property within five years.25 None of the heirs
appeared within the allotted time, and if nothing prevented the operation of the California Probate Code, their interests were defeated. The
heirs claimed that the treaty of 1827 with the Hanseatic Republics26
granted them inheritance rights equal to those possessed by citizens of
the United States, and thereby superseded the provisions of the California law. The important question was whether or not this treaty was
still in force in 1924 when Bertha Meyer died. The California court,27
just as the Kansas court had in State v. Reardon, relied heavily on
2a 23 F. (2d) 949 (1928).
24 "That at any time within five years after entry ••. any alien who was convicted or
who admits the commission, prior to entry of a felony, or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude • • • shall, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken
into custody and deported." 39 Stat. L. 874 at 889 (1917).
25 "If a non-resident alien takes by succession, he must appear and claim the property within five years from the time of succession, or be barred. The property in such case
is disposed of as provided in title eight, part three, Code of Civil Procedure." Cal. Civil
Code § 672 in force on August 2, 1924.
2 6 "Article VII. The citizens of each of the contracting parties shall have power to
dispose of their personal goods, within the jurisdiction of the other, by sale, donation, testament, or otherwise; and their representatives, being citizens of the other party, shall
succeed to their said personal goods, whether by testament or ab intestato." 8 Stat. L. 366
at 370.
2 7 In re Meyer's Estate, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 799, 238 P. (2d) 597 (1951).
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T echt 11. Hughes to hold that the outbreak of war had not abrogated
the treaty. They also followed the lead of the Kansas court in holding
that the treaty of Berl~ did not require notification to Germany in order
to keep the 1827 treaty operative.28
"We are of the opinion, in accord with the Supreme Court of
Kansas, that Article 289 is to be interpreted as not applying to
any treaty or part of a treaty which was not abrogated by the war,
since there was no occasion to revive a treaty or part of one which
had been continuously in force, and it was not the intention by the
clause, 'all the others are and shall remain abrogated,' to absolutely wipe out all former treaties between the United States and
the German states.... We think that Article 289 means that a
treaty which had been absolutely abrogated by the war could be
revived only in the manner therein provided, and that all treaties
which had been abrogated by the war and were not so revived
'are and shall remain abrogated.'"

Therefore, there is no more justification for holding this treaty in force
after May 11, 1922 than was put forth in State 11. Reardon. Both cases
base their holding on what they claim to be the intended impact of
the Treaty of Berlin. In order to make a final evaluation, material
that tends to disclose what it was believed the Treaty of Berlin had
in fact accomplished should be examined.
It is almost certain that the framers of article 289 of the Versailles
treaty intended to require notification on bilateral treaties that were
to be operative after the war. This follows from the fact that the
leading English and French authorities believed these treaties had
ceased to operate after the outbreak of war.29 Judge Cardozo also
believed that "the proposed treaties with Germany and Austria give
the victorious powers the -privilege of choosing the treaties which are
to be kept in force or abrogated.'130 Therefore, if this was its intended
interpretation when article 289 became part of the Treaty of Berlin,
Id. at 807.
"Bilateral Treaties. All treaties between Great Britain and an enemy state were
regarded as ipso facto terminated by the war and as requiring express revival by the Treaty
of Peace if it was desired that they should be in force again upon the conclusion of peace."
McNAIR, LAw OP TREATIES 549 (1938). "A state of war puts an end to treaties concluded
with a view to peaceful relations between the signatories and the object or end of which
is to strengthen or maintain such peaceful relations. • . • When peace is concluded they
do not spontaneously come out of a comatose state; they do not revive unless expressly
renewed in the peace treaty." 2 FAucmLLE, TRAITB DE Dnocr INTERNATIONAL Ptmuc 55
(1921) (translation).
so Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222 at 243, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
2B

29
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treaties which had not been the subject of a notification were no longer
in force after May 11, 1922.
Turning to a consideration of the attitude of the Executive pranch
of the United States Government, it may be noted that on March 22,
1922, under section 4228 of the Revised Statutes,81 a Presidential
Proclamation stated that "the foreign discriminating duties of t~nnage
and imposts within the United States are suspended and discontinued
so far as respects the vessels of Germany."32 It is submitted that this
proclamation indicates the executive belief that the 1827 and 1828
treaties with the Hanseatic Republics and Prussia were inoperative.
If they had been in force, the proclamation was unnecessary since both
treaties cover this matter.88 The view that treaties on which no notification was given were not in force is reinforced by a letter written by the
Department of State on March 21, 1923.84
"Sir:
The department has received your letter . ; . requesting to be
informed concerning the treaty of 1828 between the United States
and Prussia. . ..
81 "'fitle XLVIll ch. 4 Discriminating Duties. Sect. 4228. Upon satisfactory proof
being given to the President, • • • that no discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts are
imposed or levied in the ports of such nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of
the United States, ••• the President may issue his proclamation, declaring that the foreign
discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are suspended and
discontinued, so far as respects the vessels of such foreign nation." U.S. Revised Statutes.
82 42 Stat. L. 2267 (1923).
83 "Article I. ..• and that no higher or other duties upon the tonnage or cargo of the
vessel, shall be levied or collected, whether the importation be made in vessels of the United
States, or of either of the said Hanseatic Republics•••• Nor shall higher or other charges
of any kind, be imposed in the ports of the one party, on vessels of the other, than are, or
shall be, payable in the same ports by national vessels." Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and the Free Hanseatic Republics, 8
Stat. L. 366. "Article II. Prussian vessels ••• shall be treated ••• upon the same footing
as national vessels • • • with respect to the duties of tonnage • • • and all other duties and
charges, whatever kind." Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States
of America and his Majesty, the King of Prussia, 8 Stat. L. 378 (1846).
84 Quoted in- Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750 at 755-756, 223 N.W. 13 (1929). In
addition to the letter set out in the text, on August 6, 1923 the Department wrote to a
law firm that ''This Government did not notify Germany within the period referred to in
Article 289, as extended by paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty between the United
States and Germany of August 25, 1921, of its intention to revive the treaty of May 1,
1828. The Department considers, therefore, that this treaty is not now in force." 5 HAcxwoRTH 388.
Although the German Government in 1922 expressed its belief that it would be
desirable to renew all, or at least several, of the bilateral treaties between the United
States and Germany in force at the outbreak of the war [1922 FoREIGN RELATIONS, II, at
242], Secretary of State Hughes instructed the American Ambassador to Germany to notify
the revival of the Patent Agreement of February 23, 1909, explaining telegraphically to
the Ambassador on May 8, 1922 that "Of treaties made with German Empire or independent German States the United States desires to revive only Patent Agreement." Id.
at 267.
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By the treaty concluded between the United States and
Germany on August 25, 1921 ... Germany accords to the United
States rights and advantages stipulated for its benefit under the
treaty of Versailles .... Under Article 289 of that treaty bilateral
treaties with Germany concluded with each of the allied and
associated powers are in effect declared abrogated and the right
is accordec;l. to each allied or associated power to revive by giving
notice to Germany within a specified period.... This government
did not give notice within the period referred to in article 289
as extended by paragraph 5 of article 2 of the treaty between
the United States and Germany of August, last, of its intention
to revive the treaty of 1828 between the United States and Prussia,
and this treaty, therefore, is not regarded by the department as
now in force."
Another letter written by the Under-Secretary of State to the Harvard
Law Review on November 29, 1926 further reiterates this position.85
The Yale Law Journal felt that "on May 11, 1922, it became clear
that this treaty [the treaty applied by the court in Techt 11. Hughes]
was abrogated by failure to revive it by notification."36 Thus, in this
country also, it was felt that a clean slate had been provided, leaving
the way open for the establishment of well organized treaty relations. 87
Up to this point we have considered only the views of the Executive,
the State Department and some of the legal periodicals as to the
effect of no notification. It should also be noted that in Goos 11. Brocks
and The Sophie Rickmers, two of the three cases holding that the
outbreak of war itself had not abrogated the treaties under considera. tion, both of which were decided after the Treaty of Berlin came into
85 This Government considered the matter and it was not deemed advisable to give
notice within the period referred to in Article 289, as extended by paragraph 5 of Article
II of the Treaty [of Berlin] ••• , of its intention to revive the Treaty of 1828 between the
United States and Prussia. In the circumstances, the Department does not consider that
the Treaty of 1828 was effective in 1924•••• [T]his Government formally advised the
German Government of its desire to revive the patent agreement concluded between the
United States and the German Empire on February 23, 1909, and that this notice was
given within the time limit contemplated. • • • In connection with the foregoing considerations, the Department desires to point out that it is not passing on the effect of war
upon the Treaty of 1828 • . . but that it has confined itself to an expression of views with
regard to the interpretation to be placed upon Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles, the
rights and advantages of which are secured to the United States by the Treaty [of Berlin]."
40 HARv. L. R:av. 752 (1927).
86 38 YALE L.J. 514 at 519 (1929).
87 "The World War, as commonly agreed and as indicated by the Treaty of Versailles
terminated existing commitments between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers.
A clean slate was thus established for subsequent negotiations to revive former treaties or
to proceed de novo." Wallace McClure, Asst. to Economic Adviser, Dept. of State, "German-American Commercial Relations," 19 AM. J. !NJ:. L. 689 (1925).
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effect, it was assumed that failure to notify had made the treaties
inoperative after the expiration of the period for notification.38 In view
of all this, it is submitted that article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles
carried the clear meaning of its provisions into the Treaty of Berlin.
"Each of the Allied or Associated Powers being guided by the general principles or special provisions of the present treaty, shall notify
to Germany the bilateral treaties or conventions which such Allied
or Associated Power wishes to revive with Germany. . . . Only
those bilateral treaties and conventions which have been the subject of such a notification shall be revived between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Germany; all others are and shall remain
abrogated." (Italics added)
The State Department seems to have desired these pre-war treaties to
lapse, and to substitute in their place a new treaty. This new treaty
of friendship, commerce and consular rights was negotiated immediately following the war and was "most comprehensive in character and
its clauses [were] elaborated with marked care and completeness,
incorporating the latest commercial experience and the most recent
legislative policies of both countries."30 The problems that have arisen
in the period between failure to notify on· the old treaties and ratification
of the new one were caused, for the most part, by undue delay in
the ratification procedure. There is also no doubt that s9me kind of
treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation and consular rights is advisable to set forth the basic framework of peaceful relations between
the contracting parties. Without such a treaty, even the most basic
intercourse between nations cannot be carried on smoothly. Therefore,
although it appears to the writer that the theoretical and factual bases
of State 11. Reardon, Hempel 11. Weedin, and In re Meyer's Estate are
open to question, the actual results reached should not be condemned
too harshly, and perhaps were necessary for stability in our relations
with Germany. However, the lesson to be learned is obvious, and care
should be taken by the proper organs of government to prevent a
recurrence of a similar situation.
38 ''The inference is plain that the abrogation of the treaty was effected by the treaty
of peace concluded between this country and Germany in August, 1921, and which
adopted the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with certain exceptions." Goos v. Brocks,
117 Neb. 750 at 756, 223 N.W. 13 (1929). "By its terms, incorporating part IO of the
Treaty of Versailles (Art. 289), treaties which have not been revived are deemed to have
lapsed. There has apparently been no revival of the Hanseatic Convention of 1827 or the
Prussian Treaty of 1828." The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F. (2d) 413 at 418 (1930).
89 Kuhn, "The New Commercial Treaty with Germany," 19 AM.. J. INT. L. 553
(1925).
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After the new treaty40 came into force on October 14, 1925, there
was no room to question the applicability of its provisions. However,
when the United States declared war on Germany in December of
1941, many of the problems that had lain dormant since 1917 again
became important. The Supreme Court of the United States,4 i following the doctrine set down by the New York court twenty-seven years
earlier in T echt 11. Hughes, held that the inheritance provisions of this
new treaty were not incompatible with the existence of a state of hostilities and therefore were not rendered ineffective by the outbreak
of war. Since the surrender of the Axis powers, treaties embodying
provisions similar to article 289 of the Versailles treaty have been concluded with Italy,42 Rumania,43 Bulgaria,44 Hungary,45 and Japan.46
As a result of this, the possibility of a re-occurrence of the no-notification
problem has become a reality. The time has not yet elapsed for notification under the Japanese Peace Treaty, but before time had expired
under the Italian Peace Treaty, the State Department informed Italy
of all the bilateral treaties we wanted to remain operative.47 Therefore,
it can be assumed that any bilateral treaty with Italy not included in
this notification is no longer in force. In conclusion, let it be stated
that if similar action is forthcoming under the Japanese treaty, problems that have plagued our judicial system in the past will not occur
in the future, barring the repetition of cases like State 11. Reardon, and
it may be said that we are well on our way to setting up a procedure
that will eliminate difficult questions in deciding the condition of
treaty relations after the cessation of hostilities.

Stanley T. Lesser, S.Ed.
40 44 Stat. L. 2132 (1927).
41 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 67
42 "Each Allied or Associated Power

S.Ct. 1431 (1947).
will notify Italy, within a period of six months
from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its pre-war bilateral treaties
with Italy it desires to keep in force or revive. • • • All such treaties not so notified shall
be regarded as abrogated." Article 44, Multilateral Peace Treaty with Italy, 61 Stat. L.
1386 (1948).
43 61 Stat L. 1803 (1948).
44 61 Stat. L. 1956 (1948).
45 61 Stat. L. 2115 (1948).
46 "Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present treaty has come into
force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its pre-war bilateral treaties
or conventions • • • it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions
so notified shall continue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may
be necessary to ensure conformity with the present treaty••.• All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded abrogated." Article 7(a),
Treaty of Peace with Japan. U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AnMIN. SERV. 2730 (1951).
47 Dept. of State Bulletin, v. XVIII, No. 451, at 248; No. 457, at 455.
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